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ПРЕЖНИЕ ВОСПОМИНАНИЯ ИЛИ ТРЕВОГИ: РОССИЯ ВСЕ ЕЩЕ БОРЕТСЯ С ПРИЗРАКОМ О "ХОЛОДНОЙ ВОЙНЕ"

В данной статье предпринимается попытка изучить проблемы, возникающие у Российской Федерации, как основного объекта "холодной войны", с научной точки зрения. В ходе исследования применялся исторический подход к изучению проблемы, что подразумевает анализ и соотнесение исторических событий, процессов и их значимость в годы "холодной войны". Исследование было проведено на основе библиографических и архивных материалов, интернет-источников.

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This present study is an attempt to partake in the ever-evolving scholarly activities on the origins of, and the challenges confronting one of the protagonists of the Cold War - the Russian Federation. The study adopts the historical approach. This involves exploring, examining and relating historical events, processes and their relevance in the ongoing discuss on the impact of the Cold War years. Relevant data, especially on the Cold War, bi-polar world and Russia's participation are sourced from bibliographic and archival materials, as well as from credible internet sources.

Key words and phrases: Cold War; Russia; Memories; Soviet Union.

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OLD BLINDERS OR WORRIES: RUSSIA STILL STRUGGLING WITH THE COLD WAR MEMORIES®

Russia as a successor state to the defunct Soviet Union with a modicum of democratic institutions is still struggling with the past policy of containment judging by its recent behaviour in some of the ex-Soviet republics. This study suggests that the Russian attitude towards its neighbours still bears vestige of the cold war years and this issue, if thoroughly examined, should provide the political scientists with new theoretical bases which to deal with the Russian question. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Russian successful resolution of its myriad of democratic problems will invariably have great consequences on the relation between the component of the former USSR - the Commonwealth of Independence States (CIS) – (former recruits of the Cold War) and also exert some influence on the satellite states of defunct USSR as well as set a new balance of power in Europe and the world in general.

Introduction

The Cold War in Historical Perspective

Though our primary focus is principally the events after the demise of the Cold War and the behaviour of one of the belligerents of the event - The Russian Federation, which has found it extremely difficult to purge itself of the vestiges of the ideological war, going by its recent attitude and behaviour to firstly, its immediate neighbours, who are also disciples of the war and also Russia's perception of global world view as if the era of the Cold War is still very much here with us. Before we proceed to analyse the post-Cold War Russia, it is imperative and pertinent to trace briefly, the historical perspectives of the Cold War.

It is an undeniable fact that Modern day Russia played a pivotal role in the ambience of the defunct Soviet Union while the Cold War lasted. Cold War as the name implies was the state of conflict, tension and competition that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective allies from the mid-1940s to the early 1990s.

The first use of the term "Cold War" to describe post-World War II geopolitical tensions between the Soviet Union and the US has been attributed to American financier and US presidential advisor Bernard Baruch. In South Carolina on April 16, 1947, Baruch gave a speech written by journalist Herbert Bayard Swope, in which he said, "Let us not be deceived: we are today in the midst of a cold war". Columnist Walter Lippmann also gave the term wide currency, with the publication of his 1947 book titled *Cold War*.

Throughout this period, rivalry between the two superpowers was expressed through military coalitions, propaganda, espionage, weapons development, industrial advances, and competitive technological development, which included the space race. Both superpowers engaged in costly defence spending, a massive conventional and nuclear arms race, and numerous proxy wars [3; 4; 5].

The Cold War period saw both periods of heightened tension and relative calm. On the one hand, international crises such as the Berlin Blockade (1948–1949), the Korean War (1950–1953), the Berlin Crisis of 1961, the Vietnam War (1959–1975), the Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979–1989), and especially the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis raised fears of a Third World War. The last such crisis moment occurred during NATO exercises in November 1983. However, there were also periods of reduced tension as both sides sought détente. Direct military attacks on adversaries were deterred by the potential for mutual assured destruction using deliverable nuclear weapons [Ibidem].

The Cold War drew to a close in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. With the coming to office of United States President Ronald Reagan, the US increased diplomatic, military, and economic pressure on the Soviet Union, which was already suffering from severe economic stagnation. In the second half of the 1980s, newly appointed Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev introduced the *perestroika* and *glasnost* reforms. The Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, leaving the United States as the sole superpower in a unipolar world.

Mindful of the numerous invasions of Russia and the Soviet Union from the West throughout history, Stalin sought to create a buffer zone of subservient East European countries, most of which the Red Army (known as the Soviet army after 1946) had occupied in the course of the war. Taking advantage of its military occupation of these countries, the Soviet Union actively assisted local communist parties in coming to power. According to Herrnaan and Fischerkeller [2, p. 415-450].

The end of the common cause again exposed the underlying hostility between the capitalist countries and the Soviet Union. And the favorable position in which the Soviet Union finished World War II rapidly made it the prime postwar threat to world peace in the eyes of Western policy makers. The so-called Cold War that emerged from that situation featured Soviet domination of all of Eastern Europe, the development of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union, and dangerous conflicts and near-conflicts in several areas of the world.

By 1948 seven East European countries - Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia - had communist governments [3; 4; 5]. The Soviet Union initially maintained control behind the "Iron Curtain" (a phrase coined by Churchill in a 1946 speech) through the use of troops, security police, and the Soviet diplomatic service. Inequitable trade agreements with the East European countries permitted the Soviet Union access to valued resources.

This paper discusses the involvement of Russia in the ideological war termed the Cold War. It also examines the post-cold war Russia. I have quoted extensively from the Internet search machine - wikipedia. Implicitly I relied heavily on it as my primary source. The paper concludes that though the Russian Federation is now an advocate of, and protagonist of the western type Democracy and open market system, but upon the whole, it has found it increasingly difficult to divorce its past from the present in view of the fact that its behavior and engagement in recent time bear tinges of Cold War era with its immediate neighbors and in its foreign policy.

Independent Russia and the Cold War Echoes

As stated earlier, relations between Russia and its immediate neighbours cannot be said to be cordial, especially with Georgia and Ukraine. Ukraine and Russian relations as observed by The Economist (1993) are becoming increasingly fractious over the issues of apportioning debts and assets, military disputes, and ethnic Russians. Nationalism is growing in both republics, and Russia's dominance threatens the potential independence of Ukraine.

In the same vein, the Economist also concluded that: "Russian tension with Ukraine continues to escalate as talk of secession in Crimea creates concern about the Black Sea fleet. The two countries will probably work out their differences as they stop vying over who inherits the spoils of the toppled Soviet empire and begin to work on developing a relationship based on mutual economic interest" [8].

The continued skirmishes between Russia and Ukraine, a major worry to the protagonists of peace and integration in Europe must have prompted David Miliband, the British Foreign Minister to assert that: "It is not an act of hostility towards Russia for Europe to support Ukraine, but a positive move towards lasting peace".

Azerbaijan and Armenia are however friendlier to Russia and Russian's influence on them is stronger. This is understandable in view of the fact that their rulers and leaders are overtly inexorably tied to the apron strings of Moscow, and have and always doing the biddings of the Kremlin vis-à-vis their foreign and economic policies. This explains why eleven of the ex-Soviet Republics had no choice other than to kowtow to the dictates of Russian Federation by joining the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) immediately the Soviet Union ceased to exist as a subject of international law and geo-political reality in December 1991. The other Baltic States of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania decided to move closer to safe European Union and other European Institutions by joining the EU, NATO among others. Curiously however, Georgia decided to go it alone and refused membership of CIS.

Since Georgian President, Mikheil Saakashvili rode into power after ousting the Soviet sympathiser and the former President, Edward Shevardnadze, who had total loyalty to Moscow in the 'Rose Revolution' of 2003; Russia has not hidden its disdain and hostility to the President. The Russo-Georgian relations could probably have been different if Edward Shevardnadze or his appendage were the ones calling the shots in Georgia.

The reasons for the present Russian engagement in Georgia are obvious. Georgia has been orchestrating its zeal and readiness to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), purposely, to spite the Kremlin and further distance itself from the unwanted Russian influence in the region. Russia on the other hand fretted that a NATO base in Georgia could compromise its security, and further isolates it. Russia's attitude is in tandem with Weeknik and Poe [10, p. 63-65] postulation that: "First, its anarchic and self-help qualities induce states to be primarily concerned with their survival according to Waltz, in self-help system, the pressures of competition weigh more heavily than ideological preferences or internal political pressures." Self-interested states act first and foremost protect their national interests including, but not limited to, the integrity of their territory, institutions and sovereignty.

In a manner reminiscent of the Cold War period, it empowered Abkhazia and South Ossetia, indisputably and geographically and nationally part of Georgia, to agitate for self determination (the two are populated by ethnic Russians). President Saakashvili had openly declared his willingness to embrace the West and discard all Russian traces in Georgia. He vehemently refused that Russian language (the official language of the Soviet Union and that of Communism) should be taught in Georgian schools. He did not stop at that, he equally banned it as the second official language of the country in contrast to what was done by the other former Soviet republics, often referred to as countries of 'near abroad'. Russia, having considered all the anti-Russian feelings in Georgia, decided to bring the country to its keens. And this it did by placing a trade and travel embargo on Georgia [1, p. 31].

Again, the two regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia who are blood relations of Russia have since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, been under the control of Tbilisi. The desire of the two regions for self determination and the insistence and obduracy of President Saakashvili to bring them into the orbit of Georgia led to two wars in the early 1990s.

In the wars, the ill-equipped, ill-motivated and ragtag Georgian army was beaten bruised and humiliated by the combination of local fighters, irregulars from the Russian Federation, and stranded ex-Soviet soldiers who found themselves stuck in the middle of someone else's Civil War and chose to fight on behalf of the secessionists. Georgia made another vain attempt at preservation of its territorial integrity in 1993 by engaging in war against the rebellious Abkhazia. The conflict ended in favour of Abkhazia. With the series of devastating defeat of Tbilisi, both provinces have remained functionally separate from Georgia for the past 15 years, with their own Parliaments, economies, educational systems, and armies as well as a powerful narrative of valiant struggle against Georgian tyranny. It should be noted however that these two rebellious provinces were able to resist the persistent pressure from Georgia because of the fact that Russia's attempt to stick to its leadership role in the region and wade off western intervention in its 'perceived internal affairs' were largely responsible. Miliband said further that: "The Georgia crisis provided a rude awakening. The sight of Russian tanks in a neighbouring country on the 40th anniversary of the crushing of the Prague Spring has shown that the temptations of power politics remain. The old sores and divisions fester. Russia remains unreconciled to the new map of Europe" [Ibidem].

Russian relations and attitude to Azerbaijan and Armenia are totally different. In many ways, Azerbaijan is of strategic importance to the Russians than Georgia because its oil and gas endowment, while Georgia and Armenia have plenty of minerals, but little energy. The whole area is critical for existing and planned pipelines, especially for gas that can supply Europe while bypassing Russia. As Georgia is contending with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, so also is Azerbaijan slogging it out with the autonomous region of Nagorniy-Karabakh, over which it fought and lost a three year bloody war with Armenia. Presently, Armenia is in control not only Nagorniy-Karabakh, but also seven Azerbaijani villages.

The account of the war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 varied. The Georgian version claims that after several days of skirmishes with the South Ossetian forces, President Saakashvili announced a unilateral ceasefire, which he said was not observed and violated by the Russians. He then decided to shell and invade Tskhinvali, the South Ossetia capital and immediately, Russian troops and tanks started pouring in from North Ossetia through the Roki tunnel on the evening of 7th August. The Russians insist that no troops entered the tunnel and that the attack on Tskhinvali was unprovoked. Monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) trapped in Tskhinvali, reported that they heard no Ossetia shelling before the Georgians opened up. Whichever way the argument goes, the Russians responded with massive and disproportionate force and inflicted heavy casualties on the Georgians before they were pushed back and were forced to abandon the fight. An exasperated Milliband also warned Russia thus: "Yesterday's unilateral attempt to redraw the map marks not just the end of the post-cold war period, but is also the moment when countries are required to set out where they stand on the significant issues of nationhood and international law."

He also went further to say that: "Now, the conflict in Georgia has been associated with a sharp decline in investor confidence. Russia's foreign exchange reserves fell in one week by \$16bn. In one day the value of Gazprom fell by the same amount. Risk premia in Russia have sky-rocketed".

By not bothering to seek international support and then making no apologies for its unilateral attack on Georgia, Moscow distinguished this war from previous cases in which outside powers have meddled in the Soviet Union's old sphere of influence. This was a pure manifestation of the level of determination and readiness of Russia to teach Mr. Saakashvili a bitter and unforgettable lesson and a signal to the world that Russia was unstoppable. Russia was not deterred by Georgian government's stage-managed rallies featuring EU flags and calling Europe to rescue the embattled democracy. On the contrary, Russia's public relations efforts were feeble and ineffectual. Images of hapless hunger stricken Ossetian refugees clogged Russian television screens, but Moscow made few attempts to impress its version of events on the international media. But soon after, some of Georgia's claims, especially that Russian attack had preceded Georgia's shelling of civilians in South Ossetia were shown to be highly doubtful. Consequently, European countries that had initially joined the United States in promising sanctions against Russia welcomed Moscow's willingness to diffuse a situation that might damage the EU/Russian relationship in a show of the new position of the West reminiscent of the Cold War era, Miliband went on to say that: "Russia must not learn the wrong lessons from the Georgia crisis: there can be no going back on fundamental principles of territorial integrity, democratic governance and international law. It has shown in the last two weeks what anyone could have foretold: that it can defeat Georgia's army. But today Russia is more isolated, less trusted and less respected than two weeks ago. It has made military gains in the short term. But over time it will feel the economic and political losses. If Russia truly wants respect and influence, and the benefits that flow from it, Russia needs to change course" [7].

Another noticeable significance of the Cold War memories is that Russia has embarked on a new era of muscular intervention; taking recourse to its pre-Cold War era by attempting to maintain its increasingly shrinking Cold War era areas of influence which the former Soviet Satellite states are making readily available to the West in exchange for protection from Moscow. Miliband confirmed this assertion by stating that: "Ukraine is a leading example of the benefits that accrue when a country takes charge of its own destiny, and seeks alliances with other countries...its choices should not be seen as a threat to Russia or an act of hostility. Equally its independence does demand a new relationship with Russia – a partnership of equals, not the relationship of master and servant" [Ibidem].

The actions of these states have left Russia with no option other than to show little faith in multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations Security Council or the OSCE, in which it exerts considerable influence. Russian leaders strongly believe that the exiting multilateral institutions are unsubtle fronts for promoting interests in the United States and its major European allies, thus keeping alive the Cold War memories. Through these steps and convictions, as observed by King: "Russia has made the future of NATO uncertain and left the United States and its allies divided over Moscow's role in the world. If anything, the August war laid bare the United States inability to deter friends from behaving like fools and revealed Russia's proclivity to see hard power as the true currency of international relations" [6].

While in his own reaction Runner (2008) asserts that: "...the unresolved conflicts that mark the end of empire should not be ignored. The world's attention is currently on South Ossetia and Abkhazia. But the conflicts in Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh must not be overlooked. Each has its roots in longstanding ethnic tensions, exacerbated by economic and political underdevelopment".

Prime Minister Putin according to Miliband has described the collapse of the Soviet Union as "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe" of the 20th century: "I don't see it that way. Most people of the former Soviet bloc or Warsaw Pact don't see it that way. It will be a tragedy for Russia if it spends the next 20 years believing it to be the case".

The West faring the re-enactment of the Cold War has been a little bit cautious in drawing conclusions on the Russian attitude to its neighbours and the world at large as exemplified by Miliband's submission that; "indeed, since 1991 there has been no "stab in the back" of Russia. In fact, we have offered Russia extensive cooperation with the EU and NATO; membership of the council of Europe and the G8. Summits, mechanisms and meetings have been developed by the EU and NATO not to humiliate or threaten Russia, but to engage with it... The EU and the United States provided critical support for the Russian economy when it was needed, and western companies have invested heavily. And Russia has made substantial gains from its reintegration into the global economy.

As for Ukraine's relationship with NATO, according to Milliband: "It does not pose a threat to Russia. It is about strengthening Ukraine's democratic institutions and independence – things that will benefit Russia in the long term" [7].

Conclusion

Whatever may be the position of the West and the past protagonists of the Cold War, one thing is certain and that is isolation of Russia is no longer feasible and practicable. This would be counter-productive because Russia's economic integration is the best discipline on its politics. It would only strengthen the sense of victimhood that fuels intolerant national interest and nationalism in its most virulent form. This would undoubtedly compromise the world's interests in tackling nuclear proliferation, addressing climate change or stabilising the flash points in Europe and equally Afghanistan. In furtherance of this stand point, Miliband concluded that: "But the international community is not impotent. Europeans need Russian gas, but Gazprom needs European consumers and investment. The reality of interdependence is that both sides have leverage; both sides can change the terms of trade...our approach must be hard-headed-engagement. That means bolstering allies, rebalancing the energy relationship with Russia, defending the rules of international institutions, and renewing efforts to tackle "unresolved conflicts"" [Ibidem].

The choice today is clear. Not to sponsor a new Cold War, but to be clear about the foundations of lasting peace. In fact, the comment by Miliband that the war in Georgia marked "the end of the post Cold War period of growing geopolitical calm in and around Europe" should not be seen as another attempt to reignite the flame of Cold War. The newly liberated countries of Eastern Europe should as a matter of choice be able to aspire to be EU members and other world institutions of their choice. Russia should be left alone to undergo its own separate development along its culture and tradition as observed by Miliband: "Here, Ukraine is key. It has strong links to Russia and this is firmly in both countries' interests. But Ukraine is also a European country. Ukrainian leaders have spoken of their aspiration to see their country become a member of the EU. Article 49 of the EU treaty gives all European countries the right to apply. The prospect and reality of EU membership has been a force for stability, prosperity and democracy across Eastern Europe and it should remain so beyond. Once Ukraine fulfils EU criteria, it should be accepted as a full member" [Ibidem].

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**ПРЕЖНИЕ ВОСПОМИНАНИЯ ИЛИ ТРЕВОГИ:
РОССИЯ ВСЕ ЕЩЕ БОРЕТСЯ С ПРИЗРАКОМ О «ХОЛОДНОЙ ВОЙНЕ»**

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В данной статье предпринимается попытка изучить проблемы, возникающие у Российской Федерации, как основного объекта «холодной войны», с научной точки зрения. В ходе исследования применялся исторический подход к изучению проблемы, что подразумевает анализ и соотнесение исторических событий, процессов и их значимость в годы «холодной войны». Исследование было проведено на основе библиографических и архивных материалов, интернет-источников.

Ключевые слова и фразы: «холодная война»; Россия; воспоминания; Советский Союз.

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В статье приводится анализ тенденций изменения общественной активности населения провинциального города в конце XIX – начале XX вв. Прослеживается динамика и структура социального состава городских дум на примере Пензенской и Самарской губерний. Кроме того, проанализирован и социальный состав избирателей по различным основаниям.

Ключевые слова и фразы: Городовое положение; избиратели; гласные; избирательный процесс; социальный состав.

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СОСТАВ ГОРОДСКИХ ДУМ САМАРСКОЙ И ПЕНЗЕНСКОЙ ГУБЕРНИЙ В 1880-1890-Е ГГ. ©

Важной характеристикой сословного состава жителей провинциального города является степень общественной активности граждан. При анализе факторов, влияющих на общественную активность городского населения, необходимо обратить особое внимание на Городовое положение 1870 г. и 1892 г., определявших порядок избирательной процедуры при проведении выборов в органы самоуправления.

По Городовому положению 1870 г. избирательным правом обладало небольшое количество жителей города. Новое Городовое положение 1892 г. устанавливало настолько высокий избирательный ценз, что численность горожан, обладающих избирательным правом, сократилась в несколько раз. Так, средний процент по числу получивших избирательные права с 5,3 в 1870 г. снизился до 1 в 1892 г. [6, с. 20].

К 1884 г. количество жителей г. Самары достигало 75478 чел., из них получивших избирательные права по Городовому положению 1870 г. – 3246, т.е. лишь 4,3%. В 1897 г. число горожан, имеющих право участия в выборах значительно снизилось: из общего числа жителей, составлявшего 91672 чел., избирательное право получили лишь 935 чел, т.е. 1%.

Сравним количественные показатели степени общественной активности населения по Самарской губернии с аналогичными показателями по Пензенской губернии. Количество жителей г. Пензы к 1884 г. составляло 44735 чел., из них по Городовому положению 1870 г. получили избирательное право 3062 чел, т.е. 6,8%. К 1897 г. число жителей достигло 61851 чел., из них избирательное право получили лишь 392 чел., т.е. 0,6%, что в 11,3 раза меньше. Известны факты, когда приходилось производить переоценку городских имуществ: «По инструкции об упрощенном управлении число городских уполномоченных должно было составлять 12–15 человек. Между тем оказалось, что в г. Троицке (Пензенская губ.) избирателей всего 13 человек. В связи с этим губернатор обратился в Хозяйственный департамент Министерства внутренних дел за разрешением ограничить число уполномоченных 8–9 человеками. Однако министр внутренних дел порекомендовал произвести переоценку недвижимых имуществ, высказав предположение, что непременно выявится наличие таких недвижимостей, установленная оценка которых много ниже их действительной стоимости» [Там же, с. 23].