Notion "Mental Content" in the Context of S. Hurley’s Enactivism
Stanzhevskiy Fedor Alekseevich
Saint-Petersburg State Institute of Technology (Technical University)
Submitted: 12.10.2020
Abstract. The research objectives are as follows: to give an idea of Susan Hurley’s philosophy and to check whether the relevant philosophical problem of mental representation and mental content is non-contradictive. The article criticizes the traditional conception of consciousness, in which cognition is considered as an interface between perception and action, without taking into account interrelation of these processes. The problem of mental content is tackled; it is shown that normativity of non-conceptual mental content is weaker in comparison with conceptual one. Scientific originality of the study lies in the fact that the researcher introduces the name of the woman-philosopher S. Hurley, a figure of the English-language cognitive philosophy whose works are little known in Russia, into scientific use. The author clarifies the notion "mental content" and criticizes the modern cognitive theory. The research findings are as follows: correlation of non-conceptual mental content and action intention is revealed, the notion "mental content" is analysed in relation to pre-linguistic consciousness.
Key words and phrases: восприятие, действие, содержание сознания, энактивизм, Сьюзан Херли, perception, action, mental content, enactivism, Susan Hurley
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