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License Agreement on scientific materials use.
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PROBLEM OF REFERENCE CHARACTERISTICS OF STATEMENTS IN H. PUTNAM’S THEORETICAL MODEL “BRAIN IN A VAT”
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Anastasiya Sergeevna Gau
Elabuga Institute (Branch) of Kazan (Volga Region) Federal University
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Submitted:
June 1, 2017
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Abstract.
The article is devoted to the analysis of the problem of reference characteristics of statements within the framework of H. Putnam’s mental experiment “brain in a vat”, according to whom the assumption that we are brains in a vat cannot be true, as it is self-controversial. This point of view is denied by D. Chalmers, who believes that our statements and statements of brain in a vat refer to different objects - components of reality and elements of the computer model, respectively. On the basis of the research, the following conclusion is drawn: it does not matter, which of the hypotheses about fundamental foundations of the world we accept: this does not affect characteristics of the majority of our statements.
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Key words and phrases:
теоретическая модель
мозг в бочке
референциальные характеристики
автореферентность
скептическая гипотеза
theoretical model
brain in a vat
referential characteristics
autoreference
skeptical hypothesis
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